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Abstract  
Purpose – While previous studies explored the argument that allies the notion of complexity 
to the complex product-service offerings being procured, this paper explores whether there is 
a corollary with exchange governance complexity. More specifically, the paper analyzes the 
relationship between systemic complexity and complexity of contractual and relational 
exchange governance in procuring complex performance (PCP) arrangements.  
Design/methodology/approach - A multiple, longitudinal case study method is used to 
examine the relationship between systemic complexity and exchange governance complexity.  
The study deploys rich data sets by combining government and company reports with 43 
semi-structured interviews. 
Findings - Preliminary conclusions suggest that as a response to increasing systemic 
complexity, organizations respond with increasing contractual governance complexity. 
However, better performing PCP arrangements illustrate that the use of simplified contractual 
governance in form of working agreements in combination with relational governance such 
as inter-personal relationships may be more effective to counteract complexity.  
Practical implications – The paper questions whether organizations should respond with 
increasing exchange governance complexity to counteract systemic complexity. Managers 
must consider the manageability and enforceability of complex contracts in combination with 
the formation of inter-personal relationships and simplified working agreements.   
Originality/value – This study adds to the limited empirical understanding on the nature of 
long-term public-private interactions in procuring complex performance. It also contributes 
through a rare focus on the relationship between systemic complexity and exchange 
governance complexity in PCP arrangements.  
 
Keywords - Procuring complex performance, complexity, supply relationships, contracts, 
trust, longitudinal case study 
 
Paper category - Research paper 
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1. Introduction 
Insights regarding the procurement of complex performance (PCP) have only just begun to 
emerge (Caldwell and Howard, 2010, Lewis and Roehrich, 2009). To date the majority of 
studies have focused on arguments about the inter-organizational governance 'ingredients' 
associated with coordinating the combined effects of product-service bundles necessitating 
high levels of provider knowledge and/or customer interaction and “bespoke or highly 
customized” infrastructure (Brady et al., 2005). In the PCP sub-field, complexity has 
typically been defined by taking into consideration a number of factors including the extent to 
which infrastructural components of the whole system are ‘bespoke or highly customized’,  
the number of project stakeholders and the length of planning/contracting negotiation and 
construction phases (Lewis and Roehrich (2009). These initial studies are limited in two 
important dimensions. First, they adopt a relatively narrow conceptualization of complexity
1
; 
where the size of a system and its number of component parts is the principal correlate with 
complexity. However, with reference to the broader organizational complexity literature (e.g. 
Anderson, 1999; McKelvey, 1999; Levinthal and Warglien, 1999; Cunha and Rego, 2010; 
Geraldi et al., 2011), it is the dynamic interactions between these components that give rise to 
complexity – an emergent property that cannot be deduced from the properties of the 
components alone. Second, few studies have extended the complexity lens to also incorporate 
the governance 'regulator'. Following Ashby’s (1956) 'law of requisite variety' for example, a 
system is only stable if the number of states of its control mechanism is greater than or equal 
to the number of states in the system being controlled. In other words this suggests that, when 
confronted with a complex situation (such as a PCP arrangement) there are two choices – 
increase the variety in the regulator (i.e. 'more' contractual and relational governance with 
more complete and hence larger contracts, requiring more lawyers, more contract managers, 
more KPIs, more meetings, etc.) or reduce the variety in the system being regulated.  
 
It is these under-developed areas that shape the main focus and contribution of this paper. In 
addition to additive conceptual insights, the research analyzed rich (e.g. addressing both 
buyer and supplier perspectives) and longitudinal (i.e. investigating design, construction and 
operations phases) data from two case studies to help address two overall research questions: 
do successful PCP arrangements require complex exchange (i.e. contractual and relational) 
governance?; and what is the impact of exchange governance complexity on overall supply 
                                                   
1 The authors thank one of the anonymous reviewers for helping us to clarify this crucial insight. 
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relationship performance over extended periods of time? Given the empirical focus of the 
work, the paper also contributes to an emerging literature on the nature of public-private 
interactions over extended time-periods (Mahoney et al., 2009). The findings illustrate that 
contemporary forms of contracting bring together explicit and legally enforceable terms as 
well as implicit, socially embedded and legally unenforceable clauses. Additionally, findings 
show the importance of building up inter-personal and inter-organizational trust to establish 
feedback channels and increase team familiarity leading to increased performance outcomes. 
This research illustrates that organizations should manage systemic complexity through 
multiple governance mechanisms as this study showed the limits of both contractual and 
relational governance mechanisms when used individually. 
 
The paper has six sections. Following the introduction, section 2 introduces the core notions 
of complexity and exchange governance. Section 3 discusses the methodological 
considerations for the multiple case study approach. A description of the case study context 
and findings are presented in section 4. Sections 5 and 6 discuss the findings in the light of 
the conceptual background and conclude by formulating implications for managers, policy 
makers and outlining future research.  
 
2. Conceptual Background 
 
2.1. Complexity and Organizations 
Despite the relatively recent interest of management scholars in the study of complex systems 
(e.g. McKelvey, 1999; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997), complexity as a sub-field in the social 
sciences has existed for many decades
2
. From the general (von Bertalanffy, 1968) and open 
systems models (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1972), that arguably laid the foundations for modern 
organization theory (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967), via system dynamics 
(Forrester, 1961), complex adaptive systems (Holland, 1975), and deterministic chaos theory 
(May, 1976). Most management authors employ a "structural" view of complexity, taking 
into consideration the number of complicated interrelationships and institutional structures 
(Pryor, 1995; Stodder, 1995) in an organizing system. Remington and Pollack (2007), for 
example, emphasize the challenge of dealing with the non-linear, emergent behavior that can 
occur from interactions between many interconnected tasks. More pragmatically, Williams 
                                                   
2
 Of course, complexity is a hugely multidisciplinary concept, having been previously explored in a variety of 
disciplines including mathematics, physics, economics and biology (e.g. Lewin, 1992; Waldrop, 1992).  
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(2002) suggests that structural complexity creates: (i) multiple objectives with conflicting 
goals, and (ii) a multiplicity of stakeholders. Similarly, complex product systems (CoPS) 
research has highlighted how ever greater demands on performance, capacity and reliability 
result in system complexity increasing across generations (Davies, 2004). In seeking to 
extract meaningful prescription from complexity theory, many authors have effectively (if 
rarely explicitly) revisited Ashby’s law of requisite variety: “if a system is to be stable, the 
number of states of its control mechanism must be greater than or equal to the number of 
states in the system being controlled” (Ashby, 1956). In other words, proponents of 
complexity theory conclude that organizations should not try to reduce complexity, but rather 
respond via more complex strategies, structures, and decision processes (Boisot and Child, 
1999; Eisenhardt et al., 2000).  
 
In the PCP sub-field complexity has typically been defined, using the CoPS logic, as the 
extent to which infrastructural components of the whole system are ‘bespoke or highly 
customized’ (Brady et al., 2005) and service performance is a function of characteristics such 
as the number of project stakeholders and the length of planning/contracting negotiation and 
construction phases (Lewis and Roehrich (2009). Interestingly, even for PCP studies the 
predominant unit of analysis has been complexity at the level of the project, product-service 
and organization, whereas this study seeks to investigate complexity using an intra- and inter-
organizational level of analysis. For this application, it is interesting to again revisit Ashby's 
work because he adopted the relatively unusual approach of not 'building' complexity by 
assembling components, but rather looking for the constraints that reduce the potential 
variety to that observed.  
 
2.2 Complexity and Exchange Governance 
The extant purchasing and supply management literature offers limited insights into the 
impact of complexity on exchange governance (Williams, 1999). There has been much 
debate about the key ingredients of exchange governance with an increasing number of 
studies investigating, for example, whether contractual and relational governance function as 
substitutes or complements (e.g. Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Zheng et al., 2008). Likewise, with 
specific reference to relational governance components of the exchange 'mix', studies have 
distinguished between various forms of trust, such as intentional and competence trust (e.g. 
Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). The following section explains contractual and relational 
complexity as two important concepts in long-term exchange relationships.  
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Contractual Complexity 
Contractual governance refers to “explicit, formal and usually written contracts” (Vandaele et 
al., 2007, p.240), representing detailed, binding legal agreements that specify the obligations 
and roles of both parties in a relationship (Lyons and Mehta, 1997). Contractual safeguards 
are established to minimize cost and performance losses from relationship hazards (Joskow, 
1988). Scholars have argued that more complex relationships (determined by, for instance, 
asset specificity and contract duration) result in parties aiming to write more complex 
contracts in order to foresee every possible future contingency (Klein et al., 1978). Similarly, 
as investments become more specific to the buyer-supplier relationship, Williamson (1983) 
anticipated that cost-minimizing institutional choice will respond by moving from simple 
anonymous (spot) market contracting (classical contract law), to more complex long-term 
contractual arrangements with protective provisions (neoclassical contract law).  
 
Consider the particular example of contracting for public-private partnerships
3
 (PPPs). Prior 
studies have observed and argued for more complex contracts (e.g. Leiringer, 2006; Iossa et 
al., 2007) to govern these classic PCP-type arrangements. Yet, governance through formal 
contracts depends on the programmability of tasks and behaviors and the measurability of 
outcomes ex-ante (Das and Teng, 2001). Thus, the transaction process and outcome between 
two contracting organizations needs to be predictable and codifiable (Bijlsma-Frankema and 
Costa, 2005). Even in relatively simple exchange arrangements it is rarely possible to draft 
complete contracts (i.e. given the presence of asymmetric information, time and cost 
constraints, etc.) and, correspondingly, the notion of 'completeness' is particularly 
problematic in PCP (Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa, 2005) where there is a very large number 
of technological and transactional variables, all multiplied by the uncertainties introduced by 
extended timeframes (Lewis and Roehrich, 2009). Equally, formal contracts require 
monitoring to determine actors’ behavior with regards to the rules set out in the contract. 
Here again, monitoring a complex system may be impractical and/or uneconomic. In sum, 
although contractual governance complexity (e.g. the number of safeguards and 
contingencies specified in the contract and the contract length in pages: Joskow, 1988; 
                                                   
3 New public management (NPM) reforms (Dawson and Dargie, 2000; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005; Vincent-
Jones, 2006) – a prevalent theme in public policy throughout the last two decades - aimed to achieve higher 
efficiency levels, by drawing on expertise and managerial input from the private sector (Hood, 1995). 
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Egglestone et al., 2000) is often observed in PCP arrangements, it may not deliver 
meaningful enforcement and control. 
 
Relational Complexity  
Relational governance emerges from the values and agreed-upon processes in the exchange 
relationship (Macneil, 1980) and incorporates: trust and commitment (Lui and Ngo, 2004), 
relational capital (Kale et al., 2002), information sharing routines (Poppo et al., 2008), and 
informal exchange (Cook and Emerson, 1978). Unforeseeable relationship contingencies are 
safeguarded by flexibility, which allows for a bilateral approach to problem solving, 
solidarity and information sharing. Moreover, partnering organizations’ expectations of 
relationship continuity and longevity that accompany relational governance generate 
incentives to make exchange-specific investments (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Trust is 
considered to be an important element of relational governance, resulting in decreased 
relational risk (Granovetter, 1973; Dyer and Oh, 1988). Following Poppo and Zenger (2002), 
relational governance complexity is an emergent function of characteristics such as the extent 
of trust on an inter-personal and inter-organizational level and the extent of information 
sharing routines and communication channels. Increasingly dense and extended patterns of 
reciprocal interdependence and increasingly frequent interactions across all types of pre-
established intra- and inter-organizational boundaries (Scharpf 1994) all contribute to 
increased relational governance complexity. In PCP arrangements, relational governance 
often begins without previous exchange experience (i.e. they are novel, one-off contracts) and 
can be harder to maintain as the scale and scope of exchange increases, because repeated 
business is less likely and, for example in PPP arrangements, there is unlikely to be cultural 
homogeneity
4
 (North, 1990). In sum, although relational governance complexity may be 
crucial to effective PCP governance, the creation, maintenance, and enrichment of relational 
governance (e.g. networks of social ties) will be time and resource consuming (Larson, 
1992). Figure 1 illustrates the relationships among the key concepts under investigation.  
 
Please insert Figure 1 'Conceptual framework’ about here 
 
3. Research Methodology  
                                                   
4 PPP relationships are heavily influenced by: power imbalance (Grimshaw et al., 2002); divergent values and 
strategies in contractual negotiations/performance management (Teisman and Klijn, 2004); and inappropriate 
risk and benefit sharing (Dixon et al., 2005; Erridge and Greer, 2002).  
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The research uses an abductive multiple case study method (Stake, 1995; Dubois and Gadde, 
2002) and adopts Van de Ven’s (2007) approach for studying processes unfolding over time. 
To some extent the empirical fieldwork parallels the theoretical conceptualizations in this 
research study. The abductive approach presents a more accurate picture of the cumulative 
research process that is interwoven with the development of concepts and empirical findings 
of this research. The logic of abduction is that the research process commutes between 
theories and practice as an interweaving dialogue between theory and empirical findings.  
The process-based case study approach aims to identify explanations of complex phenomena 
that have evolved over time and which have received limited prior investigation (Yin, 2003; 
Suddaby, 2006). These phenomena are investigated in their natural context, generating rich 
datasets which are particularly important for the measurement of complex and intangible 
phenomena. Two UK Public Private Partnership projects were investigated across two 
different sectors: healthcare and waste management. PPPs are types of long-term inter-
organizational relationships which bring together public and private organizations for the 
design, build, operate, and finance elements. A common characteristic of PPP projects is that 
they are concerned with core public services which are often politically sensitive such as 
healthcare and education (Grout, 1997).  
 
Overall, 43 semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with different key stakeholders lasting 
between one to two hours were conducted over a period of three years. Interviews for each 
case were conducted with, for example, project managers, facilities managers and project 
directors from the private and public sector organizations forming the dyadic relationship 
(Appendix A). The research acknowledged the complex network associated with PPP 
projects, thus data collection moved beyond the dyadic relationship. Additional interviews 
were conducted with key stakeholders such as sub-contractors and relevant government 
departments. Interviewees can be categorized into three groups: first, individuals from 
multiple levels of the organizational hierarchy such as middle managers, directors and ex-
CEOs; second, individuals from different functional areas such as operational and strategic 
management and third, individuals present at different points in the relationship’s history in 
order to extract insights and to understand how the relationship has evolved. At each 
interview, two researchers were present to take additional notes which were later compared 
and typed up (Yin, 2003). Interviews were taped and transcribed, whilst the confidentiality of 
participating organizations and individuals was assured. Interview data reliability was further 
strengthened through triangulation of data sources including secondary sources such as 
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company documentation and reports from HM Treasury and the Audit Commission. In order 
to address construct validity, this study deployed different remedies: using multiple sources 
of evidence, establishing a chain of events, and having key informants review individual case 
reports (Yin, 2003; Gibbert et al., 2008). Discrepancies between different informants were 
addressed by triangulating primary interview data with secondary data sources from company 
and government reports. In addition, draft case reports were sent to key informants to clarify 
and address any occurring discrepancies. Table 1 summarizes the different tactics and their 
operationalization within our study. In conclusion, the different tactics employed within the 
study were primarily concerned with establishing consistency and visibility throughout the 
data collection and analysis phases. Consequently, the application of different tactics ensured 
valid and reliable conclusions, thus strengthening the research credibility of our work. 
 
Please insert Table 1 ‘Summary of research credibility’ about here 
 
Case analysis 
The software package NVivo was used to support the analysis of interview transcripts. Both 
authors were involved in the extensive coding and data analysis processes. Specific coding 
included contextual variables and the level of significance attached to the use of relational 
and contractual governance. Measuring contractual governance complexity was based on 
indications of documentary changes or explicit referral events, (e.g. third party legal support). 
Measurements for concepts such as performance were triangulated using primary interview 
data and secondary data such as company and government reports. Overall performance was 
measured by taking into consideration the following dimensions: (i) interviewees’ perception 
of performance outcomes measured on a 5-point Likert scale; (ii) primary and secondary data 
regarding the design phase and construction phase completion on time; (iii) primary and 
secondary data on design phase and construction phase completion on budget; and (iv) 
primary and secondary data on design phase and construction phase completion and 
operations phase service delivery to quality standards as set out in the contract. A wealth of 
secondary data is publically available because of the nature of public-private relationships 
delivering PCP arrangements which are constantly under public scrutiny.  
 
Case Selection 
Embarking on an empirical study designed to answer the research question required us to 
make ex-ante judgments of systemic and governance complexity; in effect adopting a 
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probabilistic view of complexity. Systemic complexity offers a more encompassing 
measurement and reflects a combination of previous complexity measurements (adopted from 
system complexity - Simon, 1962; Hobday, 2000). Systemic complexity was assessed as a 
function of (a) the number of project stakeholders, (b) the length of planning/contracting 
negotiation and construction phases, and (c) the degree of substantially bespoke or highly 
customized hardware and software elements. Our case selection was informed by 
considerations that Public Private Partnerships are archetypes PCP-type arrangements, 
considering the myriad of stakeholders, the extended periods of contract negotiation, design 
and construction of public sector infrastructure and services, and the high degree of highly 
customized elements (e.g. Caldwell et al., 2009; Caldwell and Howard, 2010).   
 
The positioning is relative to each other and not absolute. That means, while the healthcare 
project has been positioned as more complex than the waste management case, the healthcare 
case would be seen as less complex when compared to, for instance, airborne surveillance 
and counter-measure aircraft Nimrod/MRA4 or Heathrow Terminal 5. There were also 
differences in terms of project performance outcomes. Figure 2 summarizes the differences 
across both investigated cases. Governance complexity was measured in two parts. We 
followed previous work in using the length of the contract (in pages) and its number of 
contingencies as an indicator of contractual complexity (Joskow, 1988; Poppo and Zenger, 
2002). Finally, relational complexity was measured, following the study by Zaheer et al. 
(1998), via a proxy measure rating the significance of inter-personal and inter-organizational 
relationships as indicated by buyer and supplier interviewees.  
 
Please insert Figure 2  ‘Systemic complexity and performance outcomes across cases’ 
about here 
 
4. Case findings 
This section reports on the case findings of two investigated cases across different sectors. 
Table 2 summarizes the key case characteristics. 
 
Please insert Table 2 ‘Overview of key case features ’ about here 
 
  
4.1 Hospital Case 
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Systemic complexity 
Faced with the requirement to centralize and modernize healthcare services, an 18
th
 century 
infirmary in the town center had closed, and the majority of services were moved to a new 
hospital site. The PPP project led to the construction of a new £150M hospital providing 
accommodation for neuroscience, general and plastic surgery and adult services. An adjacent 
building accommodated the children’s hospital and a pediatric assessment clinic. The hospital 
also included coffee bars, various shops and a pharmacy. The hospital was deliberately 
designed to accommodate future healthcare options (e.g. interchangeable facilities, space for 
expansion, etc.). The principal exchange governance mechanism was a long-term contract 
between a single English National Health Service (NHS) Trust and a private partner, a 
company that combined both construction and facilities management (FM) divisions. The 
successful supplier was one of only a few companies in the PPP market with experience of 
designing, building, financing and operating hospitals. The NHS Trust had limited 
understanding and experience of PPP procurement processes. 
 
Contractual Complexity 
The systemic complexity of the project had a direct impact on contractual governance. From 
the outset of the negotiations for the project, the strategy of both parties “[…] to deliver an 
innovative solution for this project” (Project Director, public partner) led to numerous 
bespoke and customized hardware (e.g. building) and software (e.g. service) elements. For 
example, new cleaning technology was specified: “We put in ride-on dryers. All these long 
corridors we have got, to get those things you sit on that clean and polish, that takes one guy 
two hours rather than five guys on a night shift” (former Facilities Management Director, 
NHS Trust). Similarly, the contractor’s Program Director had responsibility for both the 
construction and operation phases and, as result, by incorporating 'through-life' design 
considerations from the outset, complex specifications were developed that sought to include 
all the factors that might need to be considered during the 20+ years operation phase (e.g. 
impact of room layouts and flooring material on cleaning services). Contractual consideration 
was given to how the treatment center (which initially consisted of six bed wards and an 
administrative area) could be converted into another 36-bed ward. As a result, both 
organizations spent considerable amounts of time negotiating and writing extensive contracts.  
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The contract was perceived as playing a central role in governing the complex, long-term 
supply arrangement, in minimizing risks and consequently achieving desired project 
outcomes. “There were so many contract specifications and clauses which we needed to 
negotiate during early project phases” (FM Director, private partner).  Thus, an extensive 
bespoke and complex contract was drafted. The contract addresses a high number of possible 
future contingencies and legal safeguards covering areas such as reporting and information 
sharing, performance measures, payment mechanisms and dispute resolution and termination 
procedures. The contracting process also continued throughout the period of the study (i.e. 
well into the operations phase). For instance, changing requirements regarding the need for 
portering and cleaning services led to contract (re)negotiations. “We have recently been 
through a process of trying to renegotiate the performance management system for portering 
because it was really far too onerous in the original contract. […] When the contract was 
closed there was an assumption that there would be 4,000 portering jobs a month. In the 
operational phase we exceeded this threshold, having around 25,000 jobs a month, so what 
we have at the moment is that the thresholds are not aligned to the number of jobs.” 
(Hospital General Manager). The private partner’s FM Director stated: “We found out that 
the porters were particularly busy and we did not fully understand why and we monitored the 
activities. The reason is that they are doing work to meet new Trust policies that we have not 
been informed of […] Instead of using a nurse to accompany a patient to tests; the nurses 
used two porters [...]. Unfortunately, the contract did not say anything about how we should 
handle this situation. We need to go back and rework the contract again […].” This problem 
was typical of the various problems encountered when implementing and operationalizing the 
bespoke contract in the day-to-day operations.  
 
Relational Complexity 
Having gone through a lengthy bidding and contract negotiation phase, both parties 
encouraged the establishment of inter-personal relationships during the build phase by co-
locating their respective project teams. The NHS Trust’s Project Director described the 
advantages of having co-located offices: “We had offices alongside each other in the same 
building. We had a couple of rooms at the end of their building and that meant that when 
there was a problem, we quite often could simply walk down a corridor and speak to 
someone and sort it out before it became something else.” Subsequent contract renegotiations 
at the end of the build phase were typified by an increased information flow across the 
partnering organizations because of previously built up inter-personal relationships. During 
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the transition from the construction to the operate phase, a new project team from the private 
partner took over. This effectively undermined previously established inter-personal 
relationships. Subsequent operational problems at the outset of the operations phase were 
then managed with a predominant emphasis on contractual governance. For example there 
were lengthy discussions in which both parties resorted to the contract to resolve relationship 
problems.  “We [the Trust] do not really understand why [the private partner] is not 
performing according to the contract […] there has been no information passed on to us [the 
Trust] […] and nobody from them [the private partner] came to us [the Trust] to resolve the 
portering problems […]. We now need to open up the contract again and have long 
contractual discussions” (Trust Project Manager). 
 
4.2 Waste Management Case 
 
Systemic Complexity 
A UK Local Government organization was faced with a deteriorating solid waste 
management situation, a rapidly diminishing landfill capacity and the prospect of 
strengthened environmental legislation and increase in the cost of landfill in the 1990s. The 
council is responsible for both collecting household rubbish from all homes in its area and for 
disposing of the waste that it has collected. The waste management and other cleaning 
services consist of three principal elements: (i) refuse collection, including collection of grey 
and green bins from households, bulky and garden waste collection, and trade refuse 
collection; (ii) integrated waste disposal, comprising various plants, waste transfer stations 
and recycling centers, and (iii) other cleaning services, consist of, for instance: sweeping 
roads and footways, emptying litter bins and market cleansing. The council manages 
250,000+ tons of waste for disposal annually, of which 75% is household rubbish. New 
government recycling targets and an absence of long-term landfill capacity in that area 
triggered the need for a PPP arrangement. The private partner firm constructed various waste 
facilities such as a waste-to-energy plant, a multi-materials recycling center and a new 
transfer loading station. The contract covered the management for disposal of all municipal 
solid waste in the Council area, including the management of waste facilities throughout the 
county. The buying organization had limited experience of PPP procurement processes. The 
waste management case exhibited fewer bespoke and customized design elements. However, 
the lack of relevant experience and appropriate data to design service delivery still resulted in 
long contract negotiation and design phases. The council’s Project Manager explained that 
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“[…] it was all about the output specification […] getting it right and considering all the 
constraints […] we spent a lot of time with legal people in the room […].”  
 
Contractual Complexity 
From the outset, the contract was perceived by both organizations as playing a central role in 
minimizing risks and consequently achieving desired project outcomes. Thus, a complex 
contract was drafted to govern the long-term relationship. The contract covered a variety of 
possible future contingencies and included legal safeguards in areas related to performance 
measures, payment mechanisms and dispute resolution and termination procedures. Despite 
the time spent negotiating and drafting a ‘complete’ contract, interviewees from both 
organizations later reported that during subsequent project phases the contract appeared to be 
incomplete, leading to a great many post-contractual variations. For instance, the council’s 
Project Manager described the on-going contract renegotiations that were necessary during 
the operation phase. “There were some problems during the construction phase. These were 
problems that occurred because we did not get the right information and data to write the 
output specification at the outset of the project. Now, of course, the project slowed down and 
we had to revise the contract to reflect relationship changes and so on. That is a very time 
consuming process and I wonder why we spent so much time upfront negotiating the 
contract.” Conversely, there were also problems when attempting to use the bespoke contract 
in day-to-day operations. The council’s Finance Manager suggested that “[…] the contract 
alone included 150 pages of waste term definitions. When should I ever find time to read 
these? […] the contract is highly impracticable to use […].” Indeed operating such extensive 
contracts led to frustration as expressed by the council’s former Contract Manager. “The 
contract included 44 schedules across 450+ pages […] including 150 pages of definitions 
alone. It does not make any sense trying to monitor performance based on that contract”.  To 
counteract these 'in practice' problems, the private partner’s Project Manager explained that 
both parties set up a working agreement, simplifying contractual terms of day-to-day 
operations instead of following the complex and detailed contract. "Whenever something 
changed, both organizations did not necessarily want to involve their lawyers. This would 
waste a lot of time and resources. […] we jointly decided to write a working agreement 
which contains the most important terms and which is very helpful on a day-to-day basis 
[…]" (Project Manager, public partner). 
 
Relational Complexity 
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While contractual governance mechanisms prescribed formal meetings, informal meetings 
such as after-work activities or away-days were frequently deployed in early project phases. 
The development of an early trusting relationship was based primarily on inter-personal 
relationships between boundary spanners from both organizations. The Project Manager 
described how “[…] there were a lot of formal meetings. Every week we had a number of 
meetings to discuss the contract and performance measures. To counteract this, we organized 
some informal meetings, for example, going to the pub for a drink after work and getting to 
know each other better and in a more social setting.” Prior to signing the contract, both 
organizations worked together to find two appropriate sites for the recycling center and a new 
incinerator, thereby clearly signaling a commitment to making the project a success. “Our 
partner spent a lot of time with us trying to find appropriate sites for this project. This really 
showed us that they were serious about our project and we developed some very strong 
personal relationships with them” (Contract Manager, public partner). Although this phase 
was characterized by relational governance mechanisms such as trust and information 
sharing, the outcome of the negotiating phase was a very detailed contract. Interviewees in 
this case stressed the point that their successful experience in the earlier project phases made 
them confident that they could jointly achieve a successful project. 
 
Building up such inter-personal relationships was consistently described as a slow, time-
consuming process that needs commitment and consistency across team members. The 
erosion of inter-personal relationships occurs quickly once a team member left and the 
boundary-spanning relationship was not maintained by new or existing team members. “The 
private partner’s personnel kept changing quite often and it is very difficult to build up any 
personal relationships with them. […] So it is a constant process of building relationships 
over and over again” (Project Manager, Public Partner). 
 
5. Discussion  
 
5.1. Complex Systems and Complex Contracts? 
In both PCP cases, when faced with systemic complexity, the interacting organizations placed 
high emphasis on the formation of complex contracts, including, for instance, numerous 
clauses to penalize non-compliance with stipulated terms. Indeed it can be argued that 
contracts were seen as the key mechanism for protecting the relationship against opportunistic 
behavior by the partnering organization. Moreover, this emphasis continued throughout the 
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observed timeframe, with regular contract variations arranged to reflect changes and 
customization of service delivery processes over time. Both projects were underpinned by 
regular, contractually stipulated contract redrafting and renegotiation periods throughout the 
project. This finding confirms prior studies, arguing that organizations aim for a high degree 
of contractual precision and clarity in the agreements.  
 
In these cases, in line with Ashby's law, this intent resulted in contracts comprising thousands 
of pages and a multitude of schedules and procedures. Across both cases, partnering 
organizations invested many months in customizing standard contracts to include additional 
safeguards regulating, for instance, warranties and liabilities, employment and TUPE 
(Transfer of Undertaking Protection of Employment) regulations and information and audit 
access. Considering the highly bespoke and customized hard- and software elements in both 
PCP arrangements, organizations invested a substantial amount of time and resources to draft 
complex contracts covering thousands of pages to specify possible future contingencies and 
legal safeguards. At the same time legal agreements were never complex enough. There were 
always circumstances where they lacked appropriate specifications, providing limited 
specifications and guidance in the event of operational problems, for example. Despite the 
extended contract negotiation processes involved in every case, the large number of 
subsequent contract variations suggests that no matter how many resources contracting 
parties invest in the drafting process, any contract in such a complex exchange remains, by 
definition, incomplete. 
 
The analysis also illustrated the significant difficulties associated with actually employing a 
complex contract comprised of hundreds of schedules and procedures. To counteract the 
problems of complex contracts a shortened working agreement for use in day-to-day 
operations was produced in the Waste Management case. This working agreement contained 
extracts of contract clauses, procedures and guidelines that proved helpful on a day-to-day 
basis in the better performing case. Complex, formal contracts in this case were only 
deployed to resolve relationship issues exceeding the realm of the working agreement or 
when extensive relationship changes needed to be reflected in the formal, legally binding 
complex contract. 
 
5.2 Complex Contracts and Complex Relationships? 
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The explicit contribution of complex contracts to relational governance was limited to rigid 
frameworks for formal meetings among senior personnel or for formal information sharing 
across the various stakeholders. Indeed the findings revealed very limited evidence of 
organizationally sanctioned socialization mechanisms, such as joint workshops. More 
negatively, in these PPP examples, exogenous uncertainties such as European and UK 
procurement laws, which include extensive regulatory frameworks, were perceived to leave 
little scope to apply a more relational contracting approach based on: common goals, agreed 
risk-sharing, and open communication. This suggests, in contrast with contractual complexity 
constructed between exchange partners, externally imposed (e.g. regulatory) frameworks, as 
found in both investigated cases, can serve to hinder the development of inter-organizational 
trust. 
 
So what is the purpose of the complex contract and what explains its (apparently ineffectual) 
persistence? In contrast to the assertion that incomplete contracts may lead to relationship 
ambiguity (Goldberg, 1976), these exploratory findings may suggest that attempting to 
resolve contractual incompleteness actually provided the basis for fostering inter-
organizational relationships (e.g. facilitating bilateral approaches to problem solving). In the 
waste management case, complex contracts were considered as a commitment to the long-
term relationship and a “safety net”, rather than a practical systemic governance mechanism. 
In other words, perhaps the contract provided an ongoing formal mechanism for both parties 
to observe and test each other’s goodwill over time, sequentially and gradually. This appears 
to echo Ring and Van de Ven’s (1994) findings that the development of trust is a cyclical 
process of recurrent bargaining, commitment, and execution of events among both partners. 
Returning to Ashby's terms, the findings could suggest that it was actually the growing 
complexity of relational governance (e.g. in the form of boundary-spanning individuals, 
working agreements) that provided the requisite number of control states. 
 
5.3 Complex Systems and Complex Relationships? 
Although these observations clearly reinforce the notion that contractual and relational 
exchange governance act in combination (cf. Zheng et al., 2008) and, moreover, it can be 
argued that the development of relationships in complex supply arrangements is substantially 
influenced by the process of complex contractual governance, there were clearly distinct 
aspects of the evolving complexity of relational governance.  
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Establishing inter-personal relationships across partnering organizations to overcome 
difficulties in the early more vulnerable project phases yielded positive relationship effects as 
evident in the early waste management case. However, given the systemic complexity of PCP 
arrangements, limited evidence of inter-personal trust was detected in the hospital case. 
Partnering organizations in this case experienced negative effects from the long-term contract 
negotiation process, which resulted in distrusting behavior among the contracting parties. The 
relationship in this case was typified by an aggressive contract approach and mutual blaming 
behavior. In contrast, when boundary-spanning individuals develop strong inter-personal 
relationships, this promotes norms of: flexibility, solidarity and reciprocity.  
 
Empirical evidence shows that building up inter-personal relationships at the outset of the 
project led to higher levels of flexibility in contract interpretation during later project stages. 
In such situations, contractual governance mainly functions as a ‘framing device’ to resolve 
operational problems, the use of relational governance can add the necessary flexibility to 
resolve operational problems. The formation of boundary-spanning relationships is also 
linked to opportunities for demonstrating and judging trustworthiness. Boundary-spanning 
individuals were able to immerse themselves in the partnering organization’s culture and 
environment, thus leading to a better understanding of the counterpart’s objectives and goals.  
 
Findings also suggest that inter-personal trust based on the relationship of boundary-spanning 
individuals can easily erode once an individual leaves the project. In such circumstances, 
rebuilding these forms of relationships is a gradual process that takes time. In contrast, inter-
organizational trust diminishes gradually step by step as it does not, in comparison to inter-
personal trust, rely on individuals, but rather on teams and established organizational 
frameworks. To maintain inter-personal relationships among contracting parties’ personnel, 
inter-personal trust that develops should be translated into inter-organizational trust by 
establishing organizational procedures, such as team meetings and information exchange.  
 
6. Conclusions and Implications 
This empirical study provides additional contributions to theoretical and pragmatic 
understanding of this increasingly significant phenomenon of PCP by investigating the notion 
of complexity in greater depth, with a specific focus on the relationship between systemic and 
exchange governance complexity. More specifically, the work explored Ashby’s (1956) 
assertion that if a system was to be stable, the number of states of its control mechanism must 
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be greater than or equal to the number of states in the system being controlled. Before 
outlining the key conclusions from the work, it is important to reflect on some of its 
limitations. This was an exploratory study and although established literature was used to 
frame the investigations, there was no formal hypothesis development or testing. This 
empirical setting of Public Private Partnership projects offered the opportunity to investigate 
exchange governance over an extended time period in complex supply arrangements. The 
results should also be considered within the context of the sectors and the country analyzed, 
and thus their inherent degrees of complexity. Whilst there is no apparent reason why the 
relationship between systemic complexity and exchange governance complexity in the 
analyzed relationships would not hold outside of the investigated sectors, further studies 
could examine other sectors such as transport and education. In addition, other types of PCP-
type arraangements should be investigated to further extend our findings beyond the Public 
Private Partnership domain.  
 
Three main conclusions can be identified. First, the challenge for organizations is to manage 
inherent complexity in PCP arrangements through contractual and relational exchange 
governance over time. Findings show that rigid, rule bound and complex contractual 
exchange governance alone is incapable of adaptation to meet systemic complexity, but 
provides organizations with a sense of control through a high number of legal safeguards and 
contingencies. Investing vast amount of resources upfront to write ‘complete’ contracts 
proved counterproductive as contract revisions are an natural element throughout long-term 
PCP supply arrangements. As organizations establish complex contractual exchange 
governance, they often depersonalize the social elements and practices that are vital in PCP 
arrangements and create instead a rule based system. Building up inter-personal relationships 
during early relationship stages proved useful throughout later stages. Second, the cases show 
that inter-personal relationships are crucial to establish feedback channels and increase team 
familiarity leading to increased performance outcomes. Given the high staff turnover, inter-
personal trust needs to be translated into inter-organizational frameworks to promote the 
formation of inter-organizational routines and channels for information sharing over time. 
Third, while the majority of organizations in PCP arrangements respond to systemic 
complexity with ever increasing contractual governance complexity, organizations in the 
better performing case illustrate that an increase in relational exchange governance should 
complement contractual exchange governance in PCP arrangements. For instance, findings 
show that inter-personal relationships facilitated the formation of working agreements. Rather 
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than counteracting systemic complexity merely with increased contractual complexity, the 
better performing case also deployed a combination of working agreements and inter-
personal relationships. Thus, contractual and relational exchange governance mechanisms act 
as the PCP variety reducing constraints. This study showed the limits of both contractual and 
relational governance mechanisms when used individually, hence organizations should 
manage systemic complexity through multiple governance mechanisms which evolve over 
time.  
 
Managerial and policy implications  
The study’s results have several implications in terms of organizations and governments 
charged with procuring and managing complex performance arrangements. Findings show 
that organizations in PCP arrangements respond to systemic complexity by increasing 
exchange governance complexity, leading to complex and unmanageable contracts. To 
complement complex contracts, relational exchange governance, in forms of inter-
organizational and inter-personal relationships, should be deployed to achieve better 
relationship performance. Contracting capabilities should be combined with relational 
governance activities, facilitating the formation of inter-personal trust through boundary-
spanning relationships. These may lead to increased information sharing and joint problem 
solving. However, the level of positive performance implications generated from developing 
inter-personal trust depends also on translating these relationships into inter-organizational 
frameworks. Public-private relationships, spanning 30 years or more, are increasingly playing 
a central role in delivering PCP-type arrangements. Governments entering into PCP 
arrangements need to consider the importance of relational governance in combination with 
contractual governance to balance risk sharing and to achieve high performance. The study 
shows that counteracting complexity with ever increasing degrees of contractual governance 
complexity does not necessarily lead to better performance and may even prove to be 
counterproductive as resources should rather focus on building up trusting relationships. 
Rather than seeking to contractually stipulate every possible future contingency, early 
relationship stages should be focused on building up inter-personal and inter-organizational 
trust as evidenced in the better performing case. Fostering a higher degree of interaction 
amongst partnering organizations in PCP arrangements is vital to realize long-term benefits.  
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chain of 
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Composition 
Evidence was collected from 
buyer and supplier side 
(multiple perspectives; 
multiple informants) 
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supported by documentary 
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Original material (interview 
transcripts and 
government/company 
documentary) was referenced 
 
Documents and transcripts 
were   
collected for verification  
 
Case study description was 
sent to interviewees to verify 
the analysis  
Internal 
Validity 
 
Pattern-
matching 
Data analysis Pattern matching; research 
questions; theory triangulation 
External 
Validity 
 
Use 
replication 
logic in 
multiple-case 
studies 
Research 
design 
Case studies rely on 'analytical 
generalization' rather than 
'statistical generalization'  
Case studies aim to generalize 
to some wider theory, rather 
than a population 
Reliability 
 
Interview 
guide 
 
Case study 
database 
 
Data collection 
 
 
Data collection 
Guide contained the 
procedures and questions for 
the data collection phase 
Created a case study database 
during data collection 
including interview transcripts, 
observation notes and 
government/company 
documentary 
Table 1 Summary of research credibility  
(adapted from Yin, 2003; Gibbert et al., 2008) 
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 Case A –  
Hospital  
Case B –  
Waste Management  
Performance 
Bundle 
Design Build Finance and Operate 
(DBFO) contract; construction of 
new hospital; hard (estate) and  soft 
service FM 
Design Build Finance and Operate 
(DBFO) contract; construction of new 
waste treatment plants and stations; no 
waste collection 
OJEU advert Early 2002 
 
Early 1997 
Financial 
close 
Late 2003 
 
Early 1998 
Operate since Late 2006 
 
Early 1998 (parallel build and operate 
phase) 
Contract 
nature and 
value 
Standard contract (version 3); approx. 
£150m 
Non-standard contract; approx. £35m 
Contract 
duration  
30 years 
 
25 years 
Performance 
complexity 
(average of 
interviewees’ 
perception; 5-
point Likert 
scale) 
3.1  
Late completion of design and 
construction phase; below quality 
standards on operations phase 
4.5 
On time completion of design phase; 
above quality standards during 
operations phase 
Systemic 
complexity 
 
Myriad of project stakeholders; 
prolonged planning and contract 
negotiation phase; late completion of 
construction phase; numerous 
bespoke and highly customized 
hardware and software elements 
Myriad of project stakeholders; long 
planning and contract negotiation phase; 
on time completion of construction phase 
(parallel to operations phase); some 
degree of bespoke and highly customized 
hardware and software elements 
Table 2 Overview of key case features
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Appendix A: Record of Fieldwork   
 
  Position Organization 
  
Case A – Hospital 
 
1  General Manager Private partner 
2  Director of Business Development Private partner 
3  Manager - build phase Private partner 
4  Technical Advisor NHS Trust 
5  Consultant Private Finance Unit (PFU) 
6  Board of Directors Private partner  
7  Project Director Private partner  
8  Project Manager Private partner 
9  Program Director Private partner 
10  Commercial Manager Private partner 
11  Commercial Director Private partner 
12  General Manager Private partner 
13  Board Director (SPV) Bank 
14  Project Director NHS Trust 
15  Consultant Private Finance Unit (PFU) 
16  Manager Bank 
17  FM Director Private partner 
18  Project Manager NHS Trust 
19  Project Manager NHS Trust 
20  Manager DoH 
 
  
Case B - Waste Management  
 
21  Policy Advisor - Waste 
Implementation Program 
DEFRA  
22  Contract Manager Council 
23  Contract Manager Council 
24  Project Manager Council 
25  early Project Manager Private partner 
26  current Contract Manager Private partner 
27  first Managing Director Private partner 
28  Project Manager Council 
29  Assistant Service Manager Council 
30  Waste Project Team Assistant Council 
29 
 
31  Contract Manager Council 
32  Assistant Contract Manager Council 
33  Group Finance Manager Council 
34  current Contract Manager Private partner 
35  Contract Manager Council 
36  Project Manager Council 
37  Finance Manager Council 
38  Project Manager Private Partner 
39  current Contract Manager Private partner 
40  Finance Manager Council 
41  Contract Manager Council 
42  Manager DEFRA 
43  Project Manager Private partner 
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